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Equal Citizens, Uneven Communities:
Differentiated and Hierarchical
Citizenship in Kosovo
GE¨ZIM KRASNIQI
University of Edinburgh, UK
ABSTRACT This paper looks at the case of citizenship in Kosovo and argues that the mismatch
between the idea of a ‘liberal’ state and the practice of group differentiation, on the one hand,
and the socio-political reality that emerged in the post-war period, on the other, has resulted in a
citizenship regime that is hierarchical. It aims to demonstrate how despite the legally enshrined
promise of equality, differentiated citizenship, together with a political context defined by an
ethnic divide and past structural inequalities, as well as uneven external citizenship opportunities,
contributed to the emergence of hierarchical citizenship, in which some groups (communities), or
‘rights-and-duty-bearing units’, are more equal than the others.
Introduction
In recent times, international actors (states, organisations and agencies) involved in state-
building and post-conflict reconstruction have exhibited a growing tendency to promote
group-differentiated rights and multicultural citizenship as a solution to issues regarding
ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities and diaspora integration. In part, this is due to
the fact that the concept of group-differentiated rights is often seen as a panacea for con-
flict-ridden multi-ethnic societies and states, such as the ones in the post-communist
Balkans. However, despite the promise of achieving equality, functionality and prosperity
within the newly created ‘liberal and democratic’ states, the international community’s
approach to state-building in the Balkans—specifically the citizenship models applied
therein, and the interplay between local and external agents—has resulted in a cluster
of weak and internally divided states and societies. Moreover, in some cases, the appli-
cation of group-differentiated rights in divided societies has perpetuated ethnic differences
and increased group inequalities rather than contribute to achieving equality for previously
disadvantaged groups. In other words, the international actors involved in the region pro-
moted the ideal of liberalism while implementing regimes grounded in group
differentiation.
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This paper argues that the mismatch between the ‘liberal’ state ideal and its practice of
‘group differentiation’, on the one hand, and the socio-political reality that emerged in
post-war Kosovo, on the other, has resulted in a citizenship regime that is hierarchical.
It uses the case of citizenship in Kosovo to show how despite the legally enshrined
promise of equality, differentiated citizenship, together with a political context defined
by an ethnic divide and past structural inequalities, as well as uneven external citizenship
opportunities, contributed to the emergence of hierarchical citizenship, wherein some
groups (communities), or ‘rights-and-duty-bearing units’, are more equal than the
others. It addresses the situation in which the formal equality of citizens and communities
is contradicted by the socio-political reality that some communities are better off, thus
leading to the emergence of a hierarchy of communities in Kosovo. The paper argues
that the hierarchy exists not only between the core, dominant Albanian community and
the non-dominant communities, but within the latter as well. Despite the legally enshrined
principle of equality, some communities in Kosovo form the core of the polity and society,
while others remain in the semi-periphery or periphery.
Citizenship and Diversity: Re-evaluating the Conceptual Link between
Citizenship, State and Nation
Despite the claim that liberalism provides universal citizenship (Magnette, 2005, p. 167)
and the state is blind towards different particularities in terms of ethnicity, culture and so
on, various disadvantaged groups and minorities have challenged the ‘myth’ of the ethnic
or cultural ‘neutrality’ of liberal citizenship, thus demanding a re-evaluation of the link
between state, citizenship and their ethnic/cultural/national belonging. At a normative
level, this has often been articulated as the struggle for ‘recognition of difference’
(Taylor, 1994, p. 38) and ‘group-differentiated citizenship and a heterogonous public’
(Young, 1995, p. 184). By emphasising the limits of realising group claims through indi-
vidual rights, this pluralist approach to citizenship renounces the liberal ‘universal’
approach of considering cultural differences and group particularities as private, thus
asking for recognition and representation of group interests and rights.
Another strand of this pluralistic approach is articulated in the form of liberal multicul-
turalism, which rose in opposition to the established tradition of a ‘process of majoritarian
decision-making’, as Kymlicka (1995, p. 5) puts it, and the ‘benign neglect’ (Kymlicka,
1995) of minority groups. It proposes a group-differentiated citizenship which is not a sub-
stitute for universal citizenship, but rather complementary to it. In short, proponents of dif-
ferentiated citizenship—who advocate the incorporation of members of certain cultural
groups not only as individuals but also as members of groups, their rights depending in
part on group membership catering to their special needs—argue that it can be used as
a tool for the advancement of an important principle of liberal democracy: that of equality.
Although group-differentiated rights and citizenship are informed by ideas about justice
in current political philosophy, they often serve more mundane purposes such as conflict
resolution, management and organisational efficiency (De Zwart, 2005, p. 142). Nonethe-
less, despite the fact that in many cases group-differentiated and multicultural policies
have proven successful in mitigating long-standing inequalities, they may also promote
ethnic conflict, create vested interests in group distinctions, exacerbate ethnic divisions
and entrench inequality, thus raising a ‘dilemma of recognition’ (De Zwart, 2005, p. 136).
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In practice, the demand of a non-dominant group for recognition and equality varies
from mere recognition of its status as a minority to local self-governance and political
autonomy. However, due to the fact that ‘the politics of recognition and multicultural
justice remain tied to the basic principles of political modernity: the idea and practice
of a state representing the people in its threefold meaning of nation, citizenry and sover-
eign’ (Wimmer, 2002, p. 4), in many cases when minority groups demand their differences
be acknowledged within the state in the form of autonomy, what they seek, in essence, is
not inclusion but partial withdrawal or the right to opt out from the common citizenship
(Magnette, 2005, p. 168). Consequently, the end result may be an internally divided
society and state, with various groups enjoying various degrees of rights and privileges
within a pluralised differentiated citizenship.
As regards the concept of hierarchical citizenship, I draw on Stephen Castles’s defi-
nition used to describe the global order that has emerged since the end of the Cold
War, which is composed of a hierarchy of states with varying levels of power, forming
a hierarchical nation-state system. According to Castles, the varying power of states is
reflected in a similar hierarchy of rights and freedoms of each state’s peoples: hierarchical
citizenship (2005). In a similar vein, Wallerstein’s (2004) world systems theory contains a
three-level hierarchy: core, periphery and semi-periphery. Yet, as will be shown in the fol-
lowing discussion, differentiated citizenship within the state level can be hierarchical as
well. In that case, some groups form the core of the political system, whereas others are
in the semi-periphery and periphery.
Hierarchical citizenship results from the discrepancy between the ideal of a liberal state
that is blind to group differences and institutionalised forms of differentiated citizenship,
and a reality of some groups being more favoured than others. In particular, differences in
levels of group/community protection and political representation become pertinent in
cases when there is a clear difference between the absolute equality of human rights
laid down in the legal instruments of the state and the social reality, where although
many have certain rights on paper, they lack the opportunities and resources to actually
enjoy those rights.
In what follows, I look at the process of state-building and transformation in the Balkans
in the aftermath of the fall of communism and the role of international actors in the estab-
lishment of new citizenship regimes.
Post-Communist State-building and Transformation in the Balkans
In the early 1990s, after the fall of communism and the eruption of the Yugoslav crisis,
many international actors, states and organisations alike became directly involved in the
region. A decade later, the USA and European powers (commonly referred to as ‘the
West’) were deeply involved in interventions across almost every region of the Balkans
(Petersen, 2011, p. 107). Post-communist Europe and Eurasia thus became ‘fertile
ground for testing theories of democratisation, institutional design, interest group inter-
action, and identity politics that have been developed in other geographic contexts’
(King, 2010, p. 80). The international missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter
Bosnia), Kosovo and Macedonia viewed multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity as the
recipe for healing the wounds of war and overcoming inter-ethnic divisions and cleavages;
hence, the predominant discourse revolving around the following buzzwords: ‘coexis-
tence’, ‘united in diversity’, ‘multi-ethnicity’, ‘peace and tolerance’ and so on.
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It is important to note that the Yugoslav crisis evolved in a period characterised by the
global diffusion of both a political discourse on multiculturalism and its codification into
different international legal norms, mostly embodied in international declarations and con-
ventions addressing minority rights (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 3). As a result, minority rights
standards were put high on the agenda of the external state-builders. However, as observed
by Woodward, although the failure of the Yugoslav state and the subsequent wars had a
complex but common cause, external actors varied among themselves and across the
seven successor cases in their explanations for state collapse and resulting violence,
and, most importantly, in their solutions and related understandings of the state and
state-building process (2011, p. 322). While in the cases of Slovenia and Croatia, the inter-
national community supported a Weberian state model, establishing the new states’ mon-
opolies over the use of force within their respective territories, in the cases of Serbia and
Montenegro, the focus was on regime change. On the other hand, Bosnia, Kosovo and
Macedonia represent prime sites of international intervention in the region.
In these three cases, the new state model drafted by outsiders, either foreign government
lawyers or diplomats, with the goal of ending wars between the parties imposed a fait
accompli of group and minority rights (Woodward, 2011, p. 324). As a result of this impo-
sition and lack of proper political input from local polities, these countries represent cases
of polities where ‘the political sphere has been colonized by external regulation’ (Chand-
ler, 2002, p. 203). By prioritising group-differentiated rights and perpetuating ethnicity as
the main identity signifier, the internationally drafted Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia,
Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia, UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Con-
stitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, Ahtisaari Plan and
Kosovan Constitution encourage the use of ethnicity both in the constitutional settings
and in the political relations in these countries.
The format of the ‘citizenship regime’ (Shaw & Sˇtiks, 2012) was at the heart of debates
on the nature of the future states. As is the case with other legal and constitutional pro-
visions in Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo, international intervention had a direct
impact on the civic status of individuals and citizenship laws (Shaw & Sˇtiks, 2012,
p. 310). In line with the international community’s predominant ‘multicultural vision’
and group-differentiated rights, the post-conflict citizenship regimes in Bosnia, Macedonia
and Kosovo are based on the principle of multicultural citizenship and the decoupling of
membership and identity. As a result, these three countries put in place multi-ethnic citi-
zenship regimes, meaning that although all citizens are considered equal, the political
reality involves consociational arrangements, ethnic voting and quotas, and ethnic rep-
resentation and vetoes (Shaw & Sˇtiks, 2012, p. 317). While in the case of Bosnia, the citi-
zenship regime established at Dayton in 1995 stands out for its bifurcated nature and the
existence of a plurality of regimes and conceptions of citizenship (Sarajlic´, 2012), Mace-
donia (Spaskovska, 2012) and Kosovo have preserved their unitary character, but are
decentralised on the principle of ‘ethno-majoritarianism’ (Dahlman & Williams, 2010).
Notwithstanding the crucial role of international actors in the Balkans and similarities in
state-building in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, two important points need
to be made. First, different missions had different contexts, and different compositions
thus resulted in different attitudes towards group rights and liberalism. Whereas the
Bosnian constitutional setting incorporated group rights and power-sharing instruments
to the greatest extent, in Kosovo and Macedonia, power-sharing arrangements and
group-differentiated rights are weaker, leaning towards the liberal state model. These
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differences reflect both the specificities of these cases (ethnic composition of the popu-
lation, above all), and variations regarding the preferred state-building model of the key
players: the USA and European countries (Rupnik, 2011; Woodward, 2011). In particular,
in the case of Kosovo, the USA, which was dominant throughout the process, tended
toward a more liberal model of rights, whereas the EU countries were more sympathetic
towards group rights and demands.
The second point is the twofold role of local dynamics and local actors in the process.
On the one hand, local leaders representing groups in the majority (irrespective of their
rhetoric about the unitary states and liberal model or rights) and, especially, minority
groups’ leaders, showed great desire for recognition of their group specificities. On the
other hand, while nominally sharing the international actors’ vision for a multi-ethnic
society and equality, local leaders more often than not undermined the implementation
of the legal setting or adopted and adapted it to their needs and priorities. Consequently,
this led to the emergence of hybrid political orders in the region, in which:
diverse and competing authority structures, sets of rules, logics of order, and claims
to power co-exist, overlap, interact, and intertwine, combining elements of intro-
duced Western models of governance and elements stemming from local indigenous
traditions of governance and politics, with further influences exerted by the forces of
globalization and associated societal fragmentation (in various forms: ethnic, tribal,
religious). (Boege, Brown, & Clements, 2009, p. 17)
The often unbridgeable gap between the formal and the informal, as well as between the
political rhetoric and the policy commitment, is a key factor in the emergence of hierar-
chies and inequalities.
As regards the selection of the case, from the three post-Yugoslav cases characterised by
tension between civic and multi-ethnic elements in their constitutional settings and citizen-
ship regimes, namely Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, I have chosen Kosovo for two
reasons. First, Kosovo assigns the same legal status (community) to all constitutionally
recognised ethnic groups. Second, the number of ethnic groups that are recognised in
Kosovo and provided with specific group-differentiated rights is larger. This, in turn,
makes it possible to examine the uneven manifestation of group-differentiated rights not
only in the context of the majority–minority binary divide, but also within and between
non-dominant communities.
Kosovo: Multiple Forms of Uneven Citizenship
Residents of the territory of Kosovo have been subject to various forms of hierarchical citi-
zenship put in place by various states and regimes throughout the twentieth century. The
imperial Ottoman citizenship regime, the unitary citizenship of royal Yugoslavia, the
federal citizenship of socialist Yugoslavia coupled with Serbian republican citizenship,
a nested quasi-citizenship regime in Kosovo (1974–1989), and the new federal citizenship
arrangement in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992–1999) all distinguished
between various ethno-cultural or religious categories, be it millets, nations, nationalities,
ethnic groups and so on. Despite the fact that UN Resolution 1244 mandated an ethnically
integrated Kosovo, Kosovo was de facto partitioned along ethnic lines by default due to
the passivity of the international administrators in the face of fierce resistance by local
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ethnic elites and their unwillingness to implement the integrationist elements of the peace
arrangements (Jenne, 2009). This post-war de facto partition was soon institutionalised
with the establishment of the UN-sponsored interim legal and political framework in
Kosovo. The contours of Kosovo’s new citizenship regime were set up in the aftermath
of international intervention and the adoption of the Constitutional Framework for Provi-
sional Self-Governance in Kosovo in 2001, which introduced the term ‘community’—
meaning ‘inhabitants belonging to the same ethnic or religious or linguistic group’—
instead of the more common terms ‘nation’, ‘ethnic group’ or ‘majority’ and ‘minority’.
In addition to the legally guaranteed equality of all communities, non-majority commu-
nities were guaranteed specific group rights, such as political representation, cultural
rights and quotas in employment. The Ahtisaari Plan, as well as the Kosovan Consti-
tution,1 mirrors this model of membership and political organisation established by the
UN Mission in Kosovo.
Despite the fact that constitutionally Kosovo is defined as ‘a state of its citizens’2
(Article 1.2), meaning a civic state, ‘multi-ethnicity’ is the keyword in both the Ahtisaari
Plan and the Kosovan Constitution itself. If equality is established legally among all citi-
zens, politically every citizen is defined as a member of a community. As in the UN-
drafted Constitutional Framework, in the Kosovan Constitution, the term community
refers to ‘inhabitants belonging to the same national or ethnic, linguistic, or religious
group traditionally present on the territory of the Republic of Kosovo’ (Article 57.1 of
the Constitution). All the constitutionally recognised, non-dominant communities in
Kosovo are granted specific group rights, including reserved3 seats in the parliament, at
least two ministerial portfolios in the government, and proportional representation, as
well as quotas, at other levels of governance. Thus, as I have argued elsewhere (Krasniqi,
2012), the new Kosovan Constitution, by refusing to recognise exclusions, loyalties or
claims of ancestral rights, not only defends the universalist values of civic republicanism
and individual liberalism, but also speaks out for group (community) rights and defends
their exclusivity and group-differentiated rights. Certainly, in the case of Kosovo, there
is a de-ethnicisation of state institutions on the one hand, but, on the other, a multi-
ethnic composition of the society reflected in politics, that is, ethnicisation. By being
deeply inscribed in the experience of everyday life of ordinary people in Kosovo,
ethnic categorisations at the same time define the social, political and geographical bound-
aries in which individuals can operate and are reified by those experiences (Sigona, 2012,
p. 1218). This results in ethnically blind civic state institutions, and yet the very function-
ing of the state is based on multi-ethnicity: the ethnically blind state is there to ensure that
no group will dominate or be discriminated against—at least not formally. Indeed,
elements of multiculturalism and civic republicanism are melted together in Kosovan
legislation.
However, a closer examination of the Kosovan constitutional system and legislation
shows that although all communities within the Kosovan polity are formally equal
before the law, the citizenship rights assigned to each group are uneven. This stems
from the mismatch between the idea of ‘liberal’ states and the practice of group differen-
tiation, and the emergence of a hybrid political order. This unevenness, in turn, combined
with the present socio-political reality in Kosovo and uneven external citizenship oppor-
tunities, has resulted in the emergence of a hierarchical order of communities. This mani-
fests in the sphere of political representation, local self-governance, and social and cultural
rights, thus affecting different communities in different ways.
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The citizenship hierarchy used to analyse Kosovo does not represent a static, caste-like
echelon of various groups in society or a strict constitutional pecking order of various dif-
ferentiated communities or groups. Rather, it is a tool utilised to describe the present legal,
social and political settings in Kosovo and the current position of different communities
within that setting. Some of the key factors, or independent variables, that determine
the present hierarchy of citizenship in Kosovo, and which will be analysed while
looking at each of the communities, include: constitutional setting, external citizenship,
historical legacies, demography, geographic position, (in)existence and role of a kin-
state, relations with the core-group, political agency and resources. Last but not least,
discrepancies between the equality provided for in national law and Kosovo’s social
and political reality is a determinative factor in citizenship hierarchy: while certain
rights may exist on paper, many communities lack the opportunities and resources to actu-
ally enjoy these rights. The gap between the formal legal setting and informal political
practices is largely determined by the existence of different levels of hybridity between
international and local actors in Kosovo, such as the institutional, public and hidden prac-
tices of hybridisation (Visoka, 2012).
Following Brubaker (1996) and Mylonas (2012), I consider the interaction between the
host state, non-core groups and external powers to be of particular importance in the
process of state-building in Kosovo and accommodation of various communities within
the new state. External actors, in the form of both individual states (kin-states or third
parties) and international organisations, were heavily involved in the process of shaping
Kosovo’s legal setting and continue to play a great role even today. As will be made
evident in the later section discussing the position of various communities, the existence
of an external power in general and a kin-state in particular outweighs other factors such as
size of population and political demands. Although the main focus is on internal citizen-
ship in Kosovo, the role of the kin-state is analysed also in the context of ‘external citizen-
ship’4 and the degree of rights and privileges granted by various kin-states in the region. In
other words, I will also focus on the role and impact of existing ‘citizenship constella-
tions’, defined by Baubo¨ck as ‘structures in which individuals are simultaneously linked
to several such political entities, so that their legal rights and duties are determined not
only by one political authority, but by several’ (2010, p. 848).
Thus, while looking at these aspects mentioned here, I argue that despite the almost
absolute equality of communities and citizens enshrined in Kosovo’s legal and consti-
tutional setting, in reality hierarchy prevails. As a result, some communities are more
equal than others. The present hierarchy of communities in Kosovo is drawn by dis-
tinguishing between core dominant5 and non-dominant communities, on the one hand,
and semi-peripheral and peripheral communities, on the other. Based on the present
legal setting and socio-political situation, the order of groups in the hierarchy of citizen-
ship is as follows: (1) Albanians—the core dominant community; (2) Serbs—the core
non-dominant community; (3) Turks—the semi-peripheral community; (4) Gorani and
Bosniaks—the elusive peripheral communities; (5) Montenegrins and Croats—the unrec-
ognised communities and (6) Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians (RAE)—the invisible
communities.
As far as methodology is concerned, depictions and comparisons are made using Schep-
pele’s approach of ‘constitutional ethnography’, which involves the ‘study of the central
legal elements of polities using methods that are capable of recovering the lived detail of
the politico-legal landscape’ (2004, p. 395). In other words, the paper combines analyses
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of legal documents with other primary sources, including media articles and reports, as
well as secondary sources. Rather than focusing on the legal setting alone, by examining
the overall political-legal context, this approach helps elucidate the legal and socio-politi-
cal factors that determine the current position of each of the communities in Kosovo’s pol-
itical and social system and citizenship hierarchy.
The Core (Dominant) Community: Albanians
Kosovo is not defined as a national state of its titular nation, but as a multi-ethnic state of
all citizens, guided by principles of non-discrimination and equal protection of all commu-
nities, thus pre-empting the ‘appropriation’ of the state by a numerical absolute majority
(i.e. Albanians) or the ‘the tyranny of the majority’. Indeed, Kosovo represents a state with
a complex governance structure based on a mixture of territorial and functional structures
(Stroschein, 2008). However, despite this, and the attempts to create a ‘post-national state’
where state membership and identity are, using Joppke’s terminology, ‘structurally
decoupled’ (2007, p. 44), one cannot neglect the fact that ethnic Albanians constitute
the overwhelming majority of the Kosovan population.6 As such, the Albanian community
in Kosovo occupies a central place within the new state, including domination of central
political and security institutions, as well as economic life, thus making it the core com-
munity. Despite the fact that the term Albanian figures only twice in the constitution (with
reference to the Albanian community and language), the formulation in article 3.1 of the
constitution—‘The Republic of Kosovo is a multi-ethnic society consisting of Albanian
and other Communities [my emphasis], governed democratically with full respect for
the rule of law through its legislative, executive and judicial institutions’—singles out
the Albanian community from the rest of communities living in Kosovo.
As a result, other communities in Kosovo, in particular the Serb community and the
state of Serbia, see Kosovo as an essentially ‘Albanian state’ with a civic and multi-
ethnic fac¸ade. On the other hand, many Kosovan Albanians do not consider Kosovo
(including its legal framework and state iconography) to reflect properly its overwhelming
ethnic Albanian majority. Nevertheless, Kosovan leaders have often acted in a way that
meant Kosovo assuming kin-state-like functions for Albanians in South Serbia. A case
in point is a resolution adopted in the Kosovan Parliament on the rights of Albanians in
the three municipalities in South Serbia (Resolution No 04-R-011, 2013).
Nonetheless, when it comes to various citizenship rights, such as social benefits or free
movement, Kosovo Albanians, most of whom have only Kosovan citizenship, are disad-
vantaged compared to other communities whose members are linked to other citizenship
regimes in the region that enjoy visa-free benefits. Kosovan passport holders remain the
only citizens in the Western Balkans who still need a visa to travel within the EU.
Although Albania, which is perceived by many Kosovan Albanians as their kin-state,
recently decided to grant citizenship to ethnic Albanians in the region and diaspora, it
nevertheless excluded Kosovo Albanians for political reasons from the new policy of
post-territorial citizenship based on the principle of ethnic selectivity (Krasniqi, 2013a).
The Core Non-dominant Community: Serbs
The Serbs’ position as a core non-dominant community is based on history,7 the recent
‘ethnic reversal’,8 its political organisation, the role of Serbia as a de facto kin-state,9
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and international support, rather than their numerical superiority vis-a`-vis other non-domi-
nant communities. Above all, the wide scope10 of specific group rights and protections
enshrined in Kosovan legislation make the Serb community stand out11 from other non-
dominant communities in Kosovo. These rights stretch out in different areas, from
human, cultural and religious rights to political participation and local self-governance.
In addition, even after more than six years since the declaration of Kosovo’s indepen-
dence, Kosovo Serbs remain firmly attached to Serbia’s citizenship regime, thus enjoying
political and social rights derived from their Serbian citizenship. However, notwithstand-
ing the vast array of rights guaranteed for the Serb community, it was the community worst
affected after the end of the war in Kosovo. Their numbers have shrunk as a result of
fleeing and deportation, and with the exception of northern Mitrovica, Kosovo Serbs
today inhabit mostly small, isolated, rural areas.
Kosovo’s enhanced legislative framework grants a vast array of rights and protec-
tions to its non-dominant communities. These rights were enshrined in the Ahtisaari
Plan (Annex II), the Constitution of Kosovo (Chapters II and III), Law on Protection
and Promotion of the Rights and Interests of Communities and their Members in the
Republic of Kosovo (Law No. 03/L-047, 2008) and other laws that derive from the
Ahtisaari Plan and are of ‘vital interest’ to communities. To that end, Kosovo has pro-
vided for a wide network of institutions and mechanisms dealing with human and min-
ority rights.12
In addition to the fact that Serbian is an official language,13 together with Albanian,
throughout Kosovo, the Serb community is guaranteed 10 seats in the Kosovan Parlia-
ment, at least one ministerial portfolio in the government, and proportional representation,
as well as quotas, at other levels of governance.14 Moreover, the principle of double-
majority is put in place for those pieces of legislation that are of ‘vital interest’ to the
Serb community.
In order to prevent Albanian domination in government and extend powers to the local
Serbs, the Ahtisaari Plan outlines a detailed proposal for decentralisation, including
enhanced governance powers that are allocated to local-level municipalities, including
the ability to engage in cross-border cooperation with Serbia and to form associations
of municipalities (Stroschein, 2008, p. 657). According to the Kosovan Law on Self-gov-
ernment (Law No. 03/L-040, 2008), municipalities shall exercise their own delegated and
enhanced competences. These enhanced competences are designed for Serb-dominated
municipalities exclusively, thus creating an asymmetry of municipal competences and
local self-governance powers. According to articles 22 and 23 of the Law on Self-govern-
ment, all municipalities in which the Kosovan Serb community is in the majority have
enhanced competences in the area of culture (including protection and promotion of
Serb and other religious and cultural heritage within the municipal territory, as well as
support for local religious communities) and enhanced participatory rights in the selection
of local police station commanders.
As regards asymmetry, however, the principle of asymmetric rights and competences is
also applied within the majority Serb municipalities. Thus, only the municipalities of
Mitrovica North, Gracanica and Strpce have the competence for the provision of second-
ary health care, including registration and licensing of health-care institutions, recruit-
ment, payment of salaries and training of health care personnel and administrators.
Although it is difficult to determine how much this is a political decision and how
much it is simply economy of scale and the size of the municipalities that influenced
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this particular outcome, this certainly establishes asymmetry across Serb-dominated
municipalities.
In line with the Ahtisaari Plan and in accordance with the European Charter of Local
Self-governance, immediately after the declaration of independence, the Kosovan auth-
orities, under strong international influence, initiated the creation of five new municipali-
ties with a Serb majority and the extension of one other. In the 2009 and 2010 local
elections, four new Serb-dominated municipalities came into being, thus representing a
landmark development in the integration of the Kosovo Serb community’s institutions
and legal system. As a result of the decentralisation process, the Serb community in
Kosovo forms a majority and holds power in 10 municipalities located in the northern,
eastern and southern parts of the country.
Last but not least, the Serb community in Kosovo has extensive competences in the
field of education. According to the law, primary and secondary schools that teach in
the Serbian language may apply curricula or use textbooks developed by the Ministry
of Education of the Republic of Serbia upon notification to the Kosovo Ministry of Edu-
cation, Science and Technology. In reality, education remains one of the most segregated
areas in Kosovo, with Kosovo Serb students attending schools that are part of Serbia’s
educational system. Although Kosovo has prepared and approved an integrated curricu-
lum and teaching materials for Serb primary and secondary schools, and in many cases
pays salaries for teachers working in schools run by the Republic of Serbia (Helsinki
Committee for Human Rights in Serbia [HCHRS], 2012), Serbs’ education in Kosovo
nonetheless still functions outside of the Kosovan system. The new situation created
Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008 has deepened the division
between Kosovo Serbs living north and south of the river Ibar that has existed since
1999. North Kosovo, which includes the Serb-dominated municipalities of Zvecan,
Zubin Potok and Leposavic, as well as the northern part of the city of Mitrovica
(which became a separate municipality), has in many ways become a hub for Serbs in
Kosovo, an intellectual and political centre. It holds a university (officially called ‘Pristina
University’) which is part of Serbia’s educational system. For most of the post-war period,
local Serbs, who ‘see the North as their last stand’ (ICG, 2011, p. i), have gathered around
the Serb National Council, an umbrella group representing Kosovo Serbs. In addition to
the continuous boycott of elections, urged by Serbia, local Serbs in northern Kosovo boy-
cotted the first overall census in Kosovo in April 2011. In 2012, they organised a refer-
endum where the overwhelming majority voted to reject contact with independent
Kosovo’s institutions. Serbia, Kosovo and the international community dismissed the
vote as irrelevant (Barlovac & Aliu, 2012). The resistance of Kosovo Serbs in general
and those in the north in particular against integration into the Kosovan system is ‘under-
stood by them as upholding of the remnants of the Serbian legal order in Kosovo’
(Oklopcic, 2009, p. 679).
Although largely outside the Kosovan political and legal system, Serbs in northern
Kosovo are in a rather specific, if not favourable, position compared to the rest of the
Serbs in Kosovo. They form an overwhelming majority in that region, maintain their
own institutions which are supported actively by Serbia and keep close ties with other
cities across the border in Serbia. This specific position of the north was recognised by
Serbia, Kosovo and the EU as it became a critical theme in the EU-facilitated dialogue
between Pristina and Belgrade. After 10 rounds of often gruelling talks in the EU-facili-
tated dialogue, Kosovo and Serbia reached a landmark accord on 19 April 2013 (The
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Economist, 2013), as the respective prime ministers initialled an agreement15 aimed at nor-
malising relations between Serbia and Kosovo.16 This agreement is yet another sign of the
strong international interest in the position of the Serb community in Kosovo.
While the agreement will eventually enable Kosovo institutions to establish nominal
control in the northern part of the country through the integration of the existing judicial
and security structures into the Kosovan system, certain elements of the agreement will
enhance the position of northern Kosovo as a special territory within the country. This
is evident in two fields: judiciary and policing. According to point 9 of the agreement,
there shall be a Police Regional Commander for the four northern Serb majority munici-
palities (Mitrovica North, Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic). This imposed a change in
the present organisation of the police in Kosovo, thus elevating northern Kosovo to the
status of a separate region. Likewise, as regards the organisation of the judiciary, the
agreement foresees the establishment of a panel composed of a majority of Kosovo
Serb judges by the Appellate Court in Pristina to deal with all Kosovo Serb majority muni-
cipalities. A division of this Appellate Court, composed of both administrative staff and
judges, will sit permanently in northern Mitrovica (Mitrovica District Court). In an
another attempt to single out northern Kosovo from the rest of the country and Serb-domi-
nated municipalities, the Serbian government demanded that NATO provide written guar-
antees that the Security Force of Kosovo (KSF), or a future Kosovan army, will not be
present in northern Kosovo (Flego, 2013).
This landmark agreement was followed by other agreements on the implementation of
the April Agreement, especially on the issue of elections, as well as on energy and tele-
communications. However, a key moment in the implementation of the agreement was
the 3 November 2013 municipal elections, which were the first ones organised throughout
the territory of Kosovo. Barring some incidents in Mitrovica North, the vote was charac-
terised by a higher turnout on the part of the local Serbs, thus resulting in the election of
new Serb mayors. Although the agreement still needs to be implemented in its entirety,
including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb majority municipali-
ties, once implemented, the agreement could reinforce the asymmetric17 position
between the Kosovo Serbs from the north and those Serbs living in the other parts of
the country. In this case, one could argue that in Kosovo there exists inter-community
asymmetry as well as intra-community asymmetry of rights, all part of a complex hierar-
chy of citizenship.
In general, the previous negotiation process that led to Kosovo’s supervised indepen-
dence as well as the current EU-led dialogue revolved around the position and accommo-
dation of the Serb community in Kosovo. The main demand of the Serbian state, as well as
some Kosovo Serb leaders, has been the right of Serbs from Kosovo to opt out, partially or
fully, from certain aspects of the emerging Kosovan citizenship regime and political
system. Education and health care are the two main fields where Kosovo Serbs, both in
the north and in the south, can opt out from the Kosovan system. However, as regards
the extension of the Serbian state institutions and benefits to Kosovo Serbs, two points
should be taken into consideration. First, they represent an element of political hybridity
and multiple overlapping jurisdictions that emerged in post-1999 Kosovo. Second, despite
formally labelled ‘parallel’ by the international and Kosovan institutions, they played a
vital role in the survival of local Serbs in Kosovo.
In addition, with respect to the political agency, barring the 2000–2004 period, Kosovo
Serb leaders, in particular the ones in the northern part of the territory, have refused to
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participate in Kosovan institutions as a means to improve the position of the community.
This boycott of Kosovan institutions has weakened the bargaining power of the Serb
leaders in the Kosovan system and weakened the political position of the whole commu-
nity. However, the Kosovo Serbs, backed by Serbia, participated in Kosovo’s national
elections in June 2014, thus paving the way for the emergence of a Kosovo Serb leadership
that is legitimate and representative of Kosovo Serb interests within Kosovo’s central
institutions. Equally, despite the fact that Kosovo Serbs remain tied to the Serbian citizen-
ship regime and receive preferential treatment, when it comes to issues such as free move-
ment, Kosovo Serbs occupy a lower position in the Serbian citizenship hierarchy as well.
A case in point is the 2009 agreement between Serbia and the EU on visa liberalisation,
which excludes residents of Kosovo from the visa-free-travel regime. As a result,
Kosovo’s residents, both Serbs and Albanians holding Serbian passports, are affected
by discriminatory citizenship practices such as exclusion of people from one region (or,
at least, tacit complicity in the EU-imposed exclusion) from the benefits enjoyed by all
other citizens (Vasiljevic´, 2012, p. 332).
The Semi-peripheral Community: Turks
The Turkish community in Kosovo, although quite small in number,18 occupies a specific
position within the political and legal system in Kosovo. This specific position has resulted
from the rights enshrined in the legal framework, its relations with the dominant commu-
nity and the role of Turkey, perceived as the kin-state of Turks in Kosovo.
As regards the rights of the Turkish community in Kosovo, it enjoys a wide array of
rights, mostly in the fields of self-governance and language. It has two guaranteed
seats in the Kosovan Parliament and representation in other consultative bodies for
non-dominant communities, as well as in local governance. At present, the leading
Turkish party in Kosovo (Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo—KTDP) is represented
in the Kosovan Parliament with three MPs and its president holds the position of the
Minister of Public Administration in the Kosovan Government. As part of the process
of decentralisation of power in Kosovo, the Turkish community of Mamusa was
granted the status of a municipality in 2008. This is the only Turkish-dominated muni-
cipality in Kosovo. Moreover, based on the law on the use of languages (Law No. 02/
L-37, 2006), Turkish, together with Bosnian and Roma, is in official use at the local
level. However, although the law stipulates that this is valid only ‘in municipalities
inhabited by a community whose mother tongue is not an official language, and
which constitutes at least five (5) per cent of the total population of the municipality’,
Turkish is an official language in the municipality of Prizren regardless of not
meeting the 5% criteria. Moreover, since 2008, Turkish has gained the status of a
language in official use in five other Kosovan towns, including the capital city
(OSCE, 2008).
In addition, Turkey’s good relations with Kosovo in all bilateral issues and areas of
interest have resulted in the former’s increased financial and cultural support to the
Turkish community in Kosovo. This, together with Turkey’s favourable external citizen-
ship policies towards its ethnic kin,19 has noticeably impacted the position of the Turkish
community in Kosovo, in terms of both its integration into the Kosovan system and insti-
tutions, as well as its social and economic well-being.
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The Elusive Peripheral Communities: Gorani and Bosniaks
While the Serb community in Kosovo has attracted continued attention from Kosovan
leaders, Serbia and international actors, other communities have attracted far less atten-
tion—or none at all. The Bosniak and Gorani communities in many ways remain in the
‘grey zone’ between the more organised and politically established communities described
earlier, and the RAE communities, which, as a Roma journalist put it, have become the
forgotten citizens of the newly independent Kosovo (Galjus, cited in Sigona, 2012,
p. 1215). In fact, being Slavic-speaking and Muslim, Bosniaks and Gorani, although
recognised as separate communities in Kosovan legislation and provided with reserved
seats in the Kosovan Parliament (three seats and one seat, respectively), remain caught
between multiple and often conflicting political visions and interests that assign different
identities to them. In particular, in the Prizren region, the divide between the Kosovo
Bosniak and Gorani communities is especially porous as both communities share a
number of key characteristics, with political affiliation the main distinguishing feature
(OSCE, 2010). In addition, different Balkan states such as Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia,20
and even Bulgaria and Turkey, claim them as co-ethnics and have even provided some
with passports. In other words, the tendency of neighbouring states to ‘appropriate’
Bosniaks and Gorani through the extension of partial or full citizenship rights, despite
the fact that they have their own political self-identification and mostly do not identify
with an external homeland, makes them ‘claimed co-ethnics’ (see Stjepanovic´ in this
volume).
Irrespective of their numbers and their compact territorial concentration, these commu-
nities have not profited from the decentralisation of power. Thus, up to this day, they are
minorities in Albanian-dominated municipalities in the southern and western part of the
country. In fact, leaders of these communities have demanded the creation of two
Gorani21 and Bosniak-dominated municipalities, one in the south and one in the west of
Kosovo, respectively (KohaNet, 2012). As regards linguistic rights, Bosnian is a language
in official use in three municipalities, but education remains a problem. Lacking curricula
and programmes adopted by Kosovo, a number of these Slavic-speaking communities,
especially the Gorani, are part of the education system of the Republic of Serbia.
So although Bosniaks and Gorani comprise sizable populations which are constitution-
ally recognised as separate communities, granted political representation, and reasonably
well integrated into the political system, as a result of the lack of external support, lack of
active elites, and limited educational and economic resources, they occupy a rather mar-
ginal position in Kosovo’s society.
The Unrecognised Communities: Montenegrins and Croats
Montenegrins and Croats represent two ethnic groups traditionally present in the territory
of Kosovo, which still remain constitutionally unrecognised22 as separate communities.
Although quite small in numbers and concentrated in certain regions of the country,
these two communities were recognised as separate groups in socialist Yugoslavia but
lost their status in the 1990s. As a result of the Yugoslav wars of secession and the sub-
sequent waves of deportation and migration, the number of Croats and Montenegrins in
Kosovo dropped after 1999. Nonetheless, supported by their respective kin-states,23
which have good relations with Kosovo, and profiting from an improved inter-ethnic
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climate in Kosovo, recent years saw renewed attempts by emerging leaders of these com-
munities to organise politically and demand equal recognition and treatment.
Although the newly emergent Montenegrin political leadership in Kosovo advocates for
disassociation of Montenegrins from the Kosovo Serbs, the reality on the ground is more
complex with many members of this community still reluctant to publicly self-identify as
Montenegrins, especially in cases where they are integrated into the Kosovo Serb commu-
nity and benefit from institutions financed by the Republic of Serbia (OSCE, 2010). Yet
the state of Montenegro actively supports the idea of disassociation and consolidation
of a separate Montenegrin community in Kosovo. In fact, although Montenegro recognises
Kosovo’s independence, it has nevertheless made the exchange of ambassadors con-
ditional on granting the community status and representation in the Kosovan Parliament
for its ethnic kin, as well as the return of refugees (mostly Roma) from Kosovo who con-
tinue to reside in Montenegro.
Although Kosovan politicians have promised to recognise the Montenegrin and Croat
communities and grant them political representation, both communities remain constitu-
tionally unrecognised as of yet. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen how an eventual
recognition and granting of reserved seats in the parliament would change the present
socio-political reality, improve their position, and help them integrate into Kosovan
society and the state. Although leaders of these communities perceive Croatia and Mon-
tenegro as their kin-states, at present most community members benefit from the education
and health services funded by the Republic of Serbia.
The Invisible Communities: RAE
Despite being a community with a long history of living in Kosovo and the region, Egyp-
tians and Ashkali were not recognised as separate ethnic categories from Roma until quite
recently, in 1991 and 1999, respectively. Although there are different interpretations about
the ethnogenesis and specific cultural and social traits of these communities, language is
one of the main factors that differentiates Roma from the Ashkali and Egyptian commu-
nities in the case of Kosovo. Although all the three communities are predominantly
Muslim, Roma speak the Romani language, while Egyptians and Ashkali are Albanian-
speaking.24 Although these three communities face similar and enormous challenges as
they remain caught between multiple and conflicting political structures and interests,
the Albanian-speaking Ashkali and Egyptian minorities are slightly better positioned
than the Roma, who were traditionally closer to the Serb community (Sigona, 2012,
p. 1221).
Facing problems of discrimination, marginalisation (see Sardelic´ in this volume)
inability to return (see Ðordevic´ in this volume), chronic unemployment, and lacking a
political elite to champion community rights, as well as lacking a kin-state to lobby for
them, RAE communities in Kosovo are viewed as a human rights issue to be addressed
by external organisations and agencies. Thus, as Sigona put it,
A corollary to the compartmentalisation of RAE in a human- and minority-rights
discursive and policy frame is their de facto exclusion from citizenry, with the
Kosovo authorities feeling legitimised in not treating RAE as Kosovo citizens and
political subjects, but rather as an issue for the international community to deal
with. (Sigona, 2012, p. 1223)
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Despite the fact that the Kosovan government has adopted a Strategy for Integration of
RAE Communities in order to provide them with better conditions and to facilitate their
integration into Kosovan society, their position remains vulnerable as this community con-
tinues to face enormous political, social and economic challenges. Probably, the biggest
problem faced by these communities is the lack of sustainable return25 and property res-
titution. Thus, although officially recognised as separate ethno-national communities and
provided with four reserved seats in the parliament and proportional representation in local
governance institutions, these communities remain almost completely invisible in the
socio-political landscape in Kosovo.
In sum, unlike various other groups in Kosovo, members of the RAE communities in
Kosovo struggle to enjoy basic citizenship rights within Kosovo as many of them
remain stateless or have the status of refugees or IDPs (Internally Displaced People) in
the region. Only a small number of Roma people benefit from social services provided
by the state of Serbia in Kosovo. Undoubtedly, RAE communities in Kosovo still enjoy
only partial citizenship rights within Kosovo and have no prospect of benefiting from
external citizenship policies of a would-be kin-state.
Legal Equality versus Socio-political Reality
As pointed out earlier, the ‘absolute’ equality of all individuals and extensive group rights
enshrined in the constitution and basic laws do not automatically translate into an equally
favourable social and political reality.26 Individuals belonging to non-dominant commu-
nities still face many issues and challenges, ranging from partial implementation of
basic laws27 to a lack of trust in local and central state institutions. Security concerns,
lack of sustainable return, lack of socio-economic opportunities and dissatisfaction with
the current political climate top the list of Kosovo’s non-dominant communities’ concerns.
One field that exemplifies both the discrepancy between the legal entitlement to rights
and representation and the uneven levels of distribution of these rights is representation in
the civil service. A 2013 OSCE monitoring report shows that members of the non-domi-
nant communities continue to be under-represented in Kosovo’s civil service. Although
the Kosovo Civil Service Law mandates that a minimum of 10% of the workforce must
be represented by members of non-dominant communities at the central level, and that
local-level representation must be proportionate to the demographic composition of
each municipality, at the central level, non-dominant communities occupy approximately
8% of civil service positions (OSCE, 2013). This is a clear example of the domination of
Albanians in the Kosovan civil service. On the other hand, as regards the uneven levels of
distribution of representation across non-dominant communities, RAE and Gorani are pro-
portionally under-represented, while Bosniaks, Serbs and Turks are proportionally over-
represented (OSCE, 2013).
The 1999 war and its immediate aftermath had serious consequences on the lives, prop-
erty and organisation of Kosovo’s smaller communities. As a result of the war, both the
number of people belonging to non-dominant communities and their social capital have
been reduced significantly throughout Kosovo. Nonetheless, the most dreadful legacy of
the war is the almost complete inter-ethnic segregation it produced, and which is still
almost intact more than 15 years since the end of the war. While in the rest of Kosovo
there have been significant advancements in the realm of political and institutional
integration of the non-Albanian communities, education (Pantic´, 2012) and health-care
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system remain almost completely segregated. This segregation has been institutionalised
since 1999,28 with a Kosovo-run system offering services to the Albanian community and
other non-dominant communities (Turks, Ashkali, Egyptian and Bosniak), and a Republic
of Serbia-run institutional network providing services for the Serb community, but also
other communities, including Roma, Gorani, Montenegrin and Croat.
This segregation along ethnic and linguistic lines, combined with differences in quality
of services, salaries and other social benefits offered by the two separate institutional fra-
meworks adds another major factor that contributes to the existence of an intermittent
socio-political reality regarding the position of various communities, thus practically chal-
lenging the absolute constitutional equality.
Conclusion
Undoubtedly, recognition and a policy of group-differentiated rights is a much better sol-
ution than denial. However, as the case of Kosovo shows, insistence on group-differen-
tiated rights and the contingency of various rights on membership of a ‘community’ can
produce a clear hierarchy of citizenship rights assigned to each group, and even deeper
ethnic divisions and reified group differences. This particular outcome is at the same
time a result of the very nature of differentiated citizenship—‘the dilemma of recog-
nition’—as well as of the particular Kosovan context and its hybrid political system in
which politics of recognition and differentiated citizenship affect various communities
unevenly. This in turn contributes to the emergence of hierarchical uneven citizenship.
Although formally all communities are included into the social and political systems in
Kosovo, in reality, RAE communities, and to a certain extent the Gorani and Bosniak com-
munities, remain ‘excluded from the privileged seats in the theatre of society’ (Wimmer,
2002, p. 4) and the state in Kosovo. In other words, despite the legally enshrined principle
of equality, some communities in Kosovo are more equal and thus occupy the core of the
polity and society, while some remain in the semi-periphery or periphery.
As described earlier, although Kosovo is designed as a state of its citizens with strong
guarantees and mechanisms of representation and protection for non-dominant groups, the
level of rights, political representation and socio-economic well-being that each commu-
nity enjoys remains highly uneven. While the political dominance of the Albanian com-
munity is clearly evident, among the non-dominant core, semi-peripheral, unrecognised
and invisible communities, those communities that have an active political elite and
strong kin-state (Serbs and Turks), as well as access to external kin-state citizenship,
occupy a higher and more favourable position in the hierarchy as opposed to communities
that do not possess a kin-state (RAE and Gorani). This highlights the importance of exter-
nal actors in general and kin-states in particular, as well as the impact of external citizen-
ship and citizenship constellations on Kosovo’s communities and their legal status and
socio-political positions.
Although quite complex and peculiar, the hierarchy of citizenship rights in Kosovo is
one of the many forms in which the policies of uneven citizenship rights are manifested
in a given polity. While unevenness is almost inherent in plural societies based on the prin-
ciples of group-differentiated rights, its manifestation and the nature of hierarchical citi-
zenship is susceptible to wider political, historic, cultural, demographic, economic and
regional contextual factors. Nonetheless, the existing hierarchy and position of commu-
nities in the Kosovan citizenship regime is far from static. Rather, it reflects and is
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contingent on the current constitutional setting and the political, social and economic state
of affairs in Kosovo. Any change in the legal system and in the reality on the ground would
certainly have repercussions for the citizenship regime in Kosovo and the relations among
different communities and between the communities and the central state.
Regardless of the legal definition, in the absolute majority of cases a state is appro-
priated and dominated by a core group or community, be it the ‘titular nation’, ‘majority’
or ‘core ethnic group’. However, as the case of Kosovo shows, in multicultural or plural
societies organised on the principle of political recognition of group difference, one can
distinguish not only between the core dominant group and the non-dominant groups,
but also between a core non-dominant group and other non-dominant groups. Thus, differ-
entiated citizenship is not necessarily only about a majority–minority binary divide. It
implies hierarchies as well as tensions within and between non-dominant groups resulting
from an uneven distribution of rights or structural socio-political inequalities.
Notes
1. Although in the Constitution all ethnic groups regardless of their numbers are defined as ‘communities’,
the Law on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Communities and their Members states that:
For the purposes of this law, communities are defined as national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic or reli-
gious groups traditionally present in the Republic of Kosovo that are not in the majority. These groups
are Serb, Turkish, Bosnian, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, Gorani and other communities. Members of the
community in the majority in the Republic of Kosovo as a whole who are not in the majority in a
given municipality shall also be entitled to enjoy the rights listed in this law.
So although the prime aim of the law is to regulate the rights of the non-Albanian communities, it grants
the same protection and rights to the latter in those cases when Albanians form a minority in a given
municipality (Law 2008/03-L047, 2008).
2. Although in the Declaration of Independence, Kosovo was said to be ‘to be a democratic, secular and
multi-ethnic republic [my emphasis], guided by the principles of non-discrimination and equal protec-
tion under the law’, the Kosovan Constitution (article 3.1) stipulates that ‘The Republic of Kosovo is a
multi-ethnic society’ [my emphasis]. This way the constitution makes a distinction between the state
which is ‘civic’ and society, which is ‘multi-ethnic’.
3. According to the Constitution, for the first two electoral mandates, the Assembly of Kosovo shall have 20
seats reserved for representation of Communities that are not in the majority (10 for Serbs and 10 for the
other communities). This meant that any seats gained through elections would be in addition to the 20
reserved seats. However, as of June 2014, when the two mandates ended, non-dominant communities
will have 20 guaranteed seats.
4. External citizenship is understood as ‘a generic concept that refers to the status, rights and duties of all
those who are temporarily or permanently outside the territory of a polity that recognizes them as
members’ (Baubo¨ck, 2009, p. 478).
5. The distinction between dominant and non-dominant communities is based on the power relations
between groups, not in terms of numerical representation, although in the case of Kosovo they
correspond.
6. A new census was carried out in Kosovo in 2011, but was boycotted by most of the members of the Serb
community. According to the data from this census, Albanians constitute 92.9 % of the overall popu-
lation of 1.7 million (Enti i Statistikave te Kosoves [ESK], 2011).
7. Kosovo occupies an important place in the modern Serb understanding of nationhood and statehood. In
addition to ‘the Battle of Kosovo’ (1389), which takes a central place in the modern Serb nationalist dis-
course and narratives, and the fact that Kosovo was part of Serbia and dominated politically by Serbs for
most of the twentieth century, Serbia’s treatment of Kosovo as its territory plays a great part in determin-
ing the present position of Serbs vis-a`-vis the Kosovan state.
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8. According to Riga and Kennedy (2009), ‘ethnic reversal’ occurs when ‘formally dominant majorities’
suffer status decline, while previously ‘minoritised majorities’ attain new political powers.
9. For a detailed analysis of the relationship between Kosovo Serbs and the state of Serbia see Krasniqi
(2013b).
10. Although within Kosovan legislation, the Serb community is granted wider legal and political protection
and representation compared with the other non-dominant communities, these provisions are not as
extensive as the ones enjoyed by Serbs in Bosnia for instance.
11. Although the article argues that the Serb community is legally granted additional competences in some
governing areas, it does so by comparing it with the rights assigned to other non-dominant communities
and not to the dominant community (Albanians). Likewise, the article does not discuss the merits of group-
differentiated rights assigned to each community.
12. These include: Constitutional Council for Communities (with the office of the president of Kosovo),
Ministry of Communities and Return, Advisory Office on Community Affairs (within the prime minis-
ter’s office), Parliamentary Committee on the Rights and Interest of Communities, Advisory Office on
Good Governance, Human Rights, Equal Opportunities and gender (within the prime minister’s office),
Ministerial Human Rights Units and Coordinators, Ombudsperson, and so on.
13. In addition, according to the law, the Kosovo Serb community shall have access to a licensed Kosovo-
wide independent Serbian-language television channel, which started operating in January 2013.
14. Despite the fact that the Kosovo Serbs from the north have boycotted Kosovan institutions and elections,
three Serb political groups—SLS, SDS KiM, and a citizens’ initiative named the Joint Serbian List
entered the parliament, making a total of 15 seats (www.assemblykosova.org). These parties joined
forces with other minority parties in the parliament to form a coalition with two other Albanian
parties. As a result, Serb representatives held the positions of deputy-chairman of the Kosovo Assembly,
deputy prime-minister and three ministries. In addition, they are represented in the Consultative Council
for Communities (with the office of the president of Kosovo), Advisory Office on Community Affairs
(within the prime minister’s office), Parliamentary Committee on the Rights and Interest of Communities
and other institutions.
15. No official text of agreement has been circulated. However, a Kosovo daily, Gazeta Express (‘Exclu-
sive’, 19 April 2013), published an unofficial version of the text.
16. The agreement provides for the establishment of an ‘Association/Community’ of municipalities where
Serbs comprise a majority of the population, initially made up of the four disputed northern municipa-
lities, but open to any other municipalities. This body will have full overview of the areas of economic
development, education, health, urban and rural planning and shall have a representative role to the
central authorities. Although the agreement has been widely perceived as a positive step towards the nor-
malisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, according to Gordy (2013), the agreement is more
about accommodation of political lobbies than the rights of citizens:
So fundamentally what is established here is a political lobby with limited authority but with a guar-
antee of employment for politicians who became entrenched in the parallel structures, with the
Kosovo government assuming the duty of financing their maintenance [ . . . ] More telling than
what the agreement provides is what it does not say. Although the dispute has been presented as invol-
ving the rights of ethnic Serb citizens, two words that appear nowhere in the text are ‘citizens’ and
‘rights’. This is an agreement between elites for the transfer of clients from one sponsor to another.
17. Already, according to the Ahtisaari Plan, the Municipality of Mitrovica North has enhanced competences
on secondary health care, as well as competence for the provision of higher education, including regis-
tration and licensing of educational institutions, recruitment, payment of salaries and training of edu-
cation instructors and administrators.
18. According to the last census in Kosovo, the number of Turks in Kosovo is 18,738, or around 1% of the
overall population.
19. Many Kosovo Turks have acquired Turkish citizenship and have enjoyed various citizenship rights in
Turkey. For more on Turkey’s citizenship policies of ethnic exceptionalism and selectivity see Kadir-
beyoglu (2012).
20. Bosnia’s constitutional setting and internal divisions, as well as its stance against Kosovo’s indepen-
dence, inhibit a more pro-active approach towards this community. Nevertheless, various Bosniak poli-
ticians keep referring to Kosovo’s Slavic Muslim communities as their ‘ethnic-kin’.
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21. In addition to supporting Gorani education, the Serbian government sought the support of Gorani leaders
in Kosovo by promising to re-instate the municipality of Gora and even include it in the planned Associ-
ation of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo.
22. Although they are not part of the constitution yet, the Law on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights
of Communities and their Members was amended to include those two communities and provide them
with representation in the Communities Consultative Council (Law No. 04/L-020, 2011).
23. Nonetheless, due to the fact that Montenegro does not allow dual citizenship, Kosovo Montenegrins
cannot acquire Montenegrin citizenship. Moreover, as Dzankic (2012, p. 344) shows, many Montenegrin
refugees from Kosovo had their political rights conferred in Montenegro, for they were deemed more
likely to support the pro-Serb opposition parties which would likely result in a change of political
parties in power.
24. For more on the identity formation dynamics of these groups see Elena Marushiakova et al. (2001) and
Lichnofsky (2013).
25. The number of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians in Kosovo dropped significantly as a result of migration,
war and deportation. According to the 2011 census in Kosovo, there are 15,436 Ashkali or 0.9%, 11,524
Egyptians or 0.6% and 8,824 Roma or 0.5% (ESK, 2011).
26. For a detailed profile of Kosovo’s communities and challenges faced by them see OSCE (2010).
27. As regards problems with the use of official languages, see OSCE (2008).
28. For a detailed account of the emergence of the segregated health system in Kosovo see J.D. Bloom,
Hoxha, Sambunjak, & Sondorp (2006).
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